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I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff-Appellant Syringa Networks, LLC (“Syringa”) and Defendant-Respondent 
Qwest Communications Company, LLC (“Qwest”) are competing providers of 
telecommunications network services in Idaho.  In late 2008, the Idaho Division of Purchasing 
issued a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) seeking one or more contractors to design and implement 
a telecommunications network, which would be called the Idaho Education Network (“IEN”), to 
provide broadband access and related services, such as Internet and video services, to Idaho 
public schools, state libraries, higher education institutions, and state agencies.   
Qwest submitted a bid for the project; Syringa did not.  Instead, Syringa “teamed up” 
with Defendant-Respondent Education Networks of America (“ENA”) as a potential 
subcontractor supporting ENA’s bid.  Although the “Teaming Agreement” allocated certain 
functions between the parties during the bid process, it did not address how Syringa and ENA 
would be compensated, the prices for their respective work, or the logistics of how the IEN 
project would be implemented if it were awarded to ENA.  Instead, the Teaming Agreement 
contemplated that ENA and Syringa would negotiate and enter into a subsequent agreement for 
Syringa to provide connectivity services if ENA were awarded the entire IEN contract.  
On January 20, 2009, the Division of Purchasing issued a Letter of Intent advising 
bidders of the State’s intent to award the project to Qwest and ENA.  About a week later, 
Defendant-Respondent the Idaho Department of Administration (“DOA”) issued two identical 
Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders – one each to Qwest and ENA – awarding each a contract 
related to the IEN project.  Through an amendment to the purchase orders, the State later 
unilaterally divided the work between the two contractors – making ENA the service provider of 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT QWEST'S BRIEF - 2 
record for the IEN, giving ENA responsibility to coordinate delivery of all IEN services and 
support, and designating Qwest as the general contractor for technical network services.   
Nevertheless, Syringa sued Qwest, along with two State employees, for tortious 
interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage.1  Syringa has never 
identified any conduct by Qwest that could be deemed improper.  Instead it has asserted in 
conclusory fashion that unnamed Qwest employees somehow unduly influenced the DOA, in an 
unspecified manner, to award Qwest the technical network services portion of the IEN project.   
The uncontested evidence, however, conclusively established that Qwest did not do 
anything to unduly influence the DOA to award Qwest a portion of the IEN contract.  Qwest did 
not bribe anyone, offer anything of value to anyone, threaten anyone, intimidate anyone, 
disparage Syringa or anyone else, violate any standards of trade in the industry, or exert any 
political, moral, or other influence to cause the DOA to award Qwest the IEN contract or any 
part of it.  Syringa has not presented any evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, Qwest has not 
attempted to exclude Syringa from participation in the IEN project – Qwest’s RFP response 
contemplated that Syringa would have a role in the project as a subcontractor to Qwest, and 
Qwest has repeatedly attempted to engage Syringa as a potential subcontractor on the project.   
Based on the uncontested evidence, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in 
favor of Qwest, and dismissed Syringa’s claims against it.  That judgment should be affirmed.  
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Although Syringa incorrectly contends that the trial court’s two summary judgment 
decisions were erroneous, Syringa’s Opening Brief adequately sets forth the course of 
proceedings in the trial court and the disposition of the case below, with one exception.  In 
                                                 
1 Syringa also sued the Department of Administration and ENA under different theories. 
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addition to the course of proceedings Syringa describes, Qwest notes that in response to the 
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Syringa filed a Motion for Continuance of 
Summary Judgment Proceedings under I.R.C.P. 56(f) on November 16, 2010, seeking a 
continuance “until after Syringa has had a fair opportunity to complete discovery and the 
development of its factual record.”  (R. pp. 1735-36).  Over Defendants’ objections (see R. pp. 
2033-50, 2067-70), the Court granted the Motion.  (R. p. 2588). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. The IEN and Request for Proposals 
On December 15, 2008, the Idaho Division of Purchasing issued a Request for Proposal 
RFP02160 (“RFP”).  (R. pp. 38-161).  Through the RFP, the “State of Idaho desire[d] to contract 
with a qualified industry partner or partners to establish a long-term relationship to design and 
implement the Idaho Education Network.”   (R. pp. 51-52, RFP § 3.2).  Among other things, the 
purpose of the IEN is to provide broadband access and related services, such as Internet and 
video services, to Idaho public schools and state libraries, as well as institutions of higher 
education and state agencies.  (See id.). 
Qwest is a telecommunications company that provides telecommunications network, 
broadband, and related services.  (See R. pp. 21-22, 484-85).  On December 29, 2008, 
representatives of Qwest attended a bidders conference hosted by the DOA, Office of the Chief 
Information Officer.  (R. pp. 1474-77).  Representatives of Syringa Networks, ENA, Verizon, 
Integra, and others, also attended the bidders conference.  (See R. p. 1474).  Four vendors then 
submitted proposals in response to the RFP: Qwest, ENA, Verizon, and Integra.  (R. p. 1500). 
2. The “IEN Alliance” and Its Teaming Agreement 
ENA submitted its bid as part of something called the “IEN Alliance.”   (See R. pp. 1502-
05).  The IEN Alliance bid offered to provide IEN connectivity services to 136 schools, in the 
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first phase, for an aggregate amount per month in recurring charges to be paid by the State.  (R. 
pp. 1506-09).  There is no indication in the bid as to how the recurring charges would be divided 
among the participants in the IEN Alliance.  (R. pp. 1502-34). 
The IEN Alliance is not an entity.  (See R. p. 1545, L. 9-23).  It instead relates to a 
“Teaming Agreement” between ENA and Syringa dated January 7, 2009.  (R. p. 1555). 
The Teaming Agreement describes its purpose as follows: 
ENA is seeking to become either (i) the prime contractor for the Project or 
(ii) the prime contractor for the portion of the Project which provides all 
services to schools and libraries.  If ENA or Syringa are awarded the 
Prime Contract, ENA and Syringa shall enter into an agreement pursuant 
to which Syringa shall provide connectivity services statewide to ENA. 
(R. p. 1555, § 2(a)).  The Teaming Agreement further provides that: 
If ENA wins the Prime Contract as provided in Section 2(a) above, the 
parties shall execute a partnership agreement as specified in this 
agreement that will also include any required flow-down provisions or 
other appropriate terms similar to those set forth in the Prime Contract. 
(R. p. 1556, § 3(a)).  In its Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition, Syringa’s representative testified that the 
Teaming Agreement left certain key terms open for future negotiation: 
Q. . . . [Yo]u’ll note in section 2(a) it says “If ENA or Syringa 
are awarded the Prime Contract, ENA and Syringa shall enter into 
an agreement pursuant to which Syringa shall provide connectivity 
services statewide to ENA.” 
 Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Subsequent to ENA being awarded a contract, did ENA and 
Syringa enter into an agreement pursuant to which Syringa shall 
provide connectivity services statewide to ENA? 
A. Well, this agreement specifically states how the workflow 
would happen.  What this agreement does not state is how the 
money flow would happen. 
Q. Explain. 
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A. The logistics of how orders would be placed, the logistics 
of how billing would occur, when billing would occur, how you 
would get paid. The subsequent agreement was for the logistics of 
what this Teaming Agreement defined as a work -- you know, as a 
work body should the IEN Alliance win. 
Q. So if you turn to paragraph 3 . . . it talks about ENA and 
Syringa responsibilities.  Is that the workflow you were 
discussing? 
A. Yes, division of labor. 
Q. Division of labor.  And if I understand your testimony 
correctly, there is not within this Teaming Agreement a division of 
money? 
A. There is not the logistics of how all of that would work. 
Q. And at the time you entered into this Teaming Agreement, 
how did you expect that to be worked out? 
A. In subsequent negotiations upon winning.  We knew what 
things cost.  We didn’t know the way the money would flow. 
Q. Did you at any time enter into a second contract with ENA 
delineating how the money would flow? 
A. We did not. 
Q. Okay.  Did you at any time enter into a subsequent contract 
with ENA regarding the logistics of order entry, billing, and 
whatnot? 
A. We did not. 
Q. Okay.  Those terms remained unresolved? 
A. Correct. 
(R. pp. 1546, L. 6 – 1548, L. 7).  Thus, the Teaming Agreement did not address how Syringa and 
ENA would be compensated, the price for their respective work, or the logistics of how the IEN 
project would be implemented if it were awarded to ENA. 
3. The DOA’s Notice of Award, and ENA’s Aggressive Pursuit of the Lead Role 
for the Entire Contract 
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On January 20, 2009, the Idaho Division of Purchasing issued a Letter of Intent (“LOI”) 
advising bidders of the State’s intent “to award to Qwest Communications Company LLC and 
Education Networks of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC. . . .”  (R. p. 1559 (emphasis in 
original)).  Between December 15, 2008 (the day the RFP was issued) and January 20, 2009 
(when the LOI was issued), no representative of Qwest initiated any communications or 
attempted to influence anyone associated with the Idaho state government regarding the RFP.2   
(R. p. 1563, ¶ 6; R. p. 1569, ¶ 6; R. pp. 1574, L. 2 – 1575, L. 6). 
Idaho provides a five-day period for dissatisfied bidders to appeal the decision to award a 
contract after the issuance of an LOI.  (See R. p. 1577).  The day after the LOI was issued, on 
January 21, 2001, ENA representatives began meeting with DOA employee Laura Hill to initiate 
certain actions concerning the IEN project.  (R. pp. 1579, 1581-82).  Specifically, ENA 
employee Bob Collie, “met with Laura Hill [that] morning and . . . had several follow-up phone 
calls and contacts” with her that day.  (R. p. 1582).  After those discussions, Laura Hill reported 
that the following actions were taking place: 
Pro bono E-Rate paperwork filing assistance from ENA has already started 
in earnest.  Again, I did not request, ENA offered their probono support. . . . 
ENA is working up a draft teaming agreement, with ENA as the Lead, 
supported by two subcontractors, Qwest and Syringa, which they will 
socialize with Mark Little, after vetting internally with both Qwest and 
Syringa.  Note this includes a proposed governance model, where ENA 
would serve as the overall lead and responsible entity for this network.” 
                                                 
2 Qwest did communicate with the DOA at a bidders conference in December 2008, but that 
event was initiated by the DOA, and Qwest did not attempt to influence anyone from the DOA regarding 
the RFP at the bidders conference.  (See R. pp. 1474-77).  In January 2009, after Qwest submitted its 
proposal, the DOA requested that Qwest provide a signature page that matched the one provided in the 
RFP package, which Qwest promptly provided.  Again, the DOA initiated the communication with 
Qwest, and Qwest did not attempt to influence anyone at the DOA regarding the RFP.  (R. p. 1563, ¶ 6; 
R. p. 1569, ¶ 6).   
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(R. p. 1579).  Qwest did not take any comparable actions during the bid protest period.  Qwest’s 
sole contact with the DOA during the appeal period was a single request by a Qwest employee, 
Clint Berry, to the State’s Chief Information Officer, Greg Zickau, to discuss the IEN over 
coffee.  Mr. Berry does not recall that such a meeting actually took place.  (R. p. 1569, ¶ 7). 
4. The DOA’s Allocation of Responsibilities for the IEN Project 
On January 28, 2009, the DOA issued two identical Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders – 
one each to Qwest and ENA – awarding each a contract related to the IEN project.  (R. pp. 1584-
87).  During this same time-frame, the DOA also met jointly with ENA and Qwest to discuss 
how the DOA would implement the IEN project, since two vendors received contracts.  (R. pp. 
1590, L. 7 – 1591, L. 3; 1593, L. 9-17;  1594, L. 1 – 1596, L. 10).   
In these meetings, the DOA specifically “asked both the primes [ENA and Qwest] to 
come back with suggestions to the draft strategic visions that we [DOA] had” with respect to 
IEN implementation.  (R. pp. 1604, L. 14 – 1605, L. 6).  The DOA then advised ENA and Qwest 
that it would hold separate meetings with each of them before holding further joint meetings.  
(R. p. 2426).  In response to this request, Clint Berry and Jim Schmit of Qwest then met with 
Teresa Luna, Laura Hill, and Greg Zickau of the DOA on February 9, 2009.  (See R. pp. 1607).  
At this meeting, the DOA asked the Qwest representatives to put “their concerns and their 
recommendations” in writing.  (R. pp. 1597, L. 22 – 1598, L. 14). 
Qwest provided its written recommendation to the DOA on February 10, 2009.  (R. pp. 
1608-16).  Qwest recommended that it be the designated IEN network provider with overall 
responsibility for the project, with ENA providing certain training and filing assistance and 
application support.  (R. pp. 1611-16).  Qwest also provided a proposed amendment to the RFP 
award that would have implemented this division of responsibilities.  (R. p. 1609 (marked as 
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Deposition Ex. 42)).  According to Laura Hill of the DOA, she “didn’t do anything with” 
Qwest’s submission and probably did not read it.  (R. pp. 1597, L. 14 – 1599, L. 8). 
Ms. Hill specifically testified that she did not use the proposed amendment provided by 
Qwest after the February 9 meeting: 
Q.   In doing that, did you use the draft amendment sent by Mr. Berry to 
you on February 10, which is Exhibit 42, as a template? 
A.   No, I did not, because I had to go back to the original document that 
[Deputy Attorney General] Melissa [Vandenberg] looked at, which was 
the draft . . . – it’s that last strategic plan dated on the 5th, and I had to go 
back to that chart that had the two providers in it. . . . 
MR. SCHOSSBERGER:  Exhibit 37? 
THE WITNESS:  Yeah, 37.  I had to take that chart and stick it in there, 
and that’s what I did. 
Q.   (BY MR. LOMBARDI):  Okay.  Well, let me just ask you to take a 
look at Exhibit 42, because at a glance, at least, it appears that Exhibit 42 
may have also been used by you as a template for your preparation of 
Exhibit -- . . . . 
A.   It was not. 
Q.   It was not.  Okay. 
A.   It was not, no. . . . 
(R. pp. ***, 1602, L. 9 – 1603, L. 11 (emphasis added); see R. pp. 1600, L. 9 – 1602, L. 8).  
Instead, Ms. Hill took her strategic implementation plan for the IEN, and used it to draft 
amendments dividing responsibility between Qwest and ENA.  (R. pp. 1600, L. 9 – 1602, L. 3).   
Ultimately, the DOA used the amendments drafted by Ms. Hill to amend the RFP award 
and allocate responsibilities for the IEN project between ENA and Qwest through a second set of 
Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders.  (Compare R. pp. 1618-22 with R. pp. 1624-27 (Qwest 
SBPO Change Order 01) and R. pp. 1629-32 (ENA SBPO Change Order 01)).  Among other 
things, these “Amendment No. 1s” allocated to ENA – not Qwest –  responsibility to “coordinate 
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overall delivery of all IEN network services and support.”  (R. p. 1631, Ex. 19 ¶¶ 1-2).  This is 
the opposite of what Qwest requested.  The amendments did, however, designate Qwest as the 
“general contractor for all IEN technical network services.”  (R. p. 1626, Ex. 18 ¶ 1).   
5. Syringa’s Assertion that Qwest “Pressure[d] ENA to Subcontract with 
Qwest” 
In its Opening Brief, at pages 23-34, Syringa contends that Qwest learned on February 6, 
2009, that the State expected to designate ENA as its IEN E-Rate provider, and that, armed with 
this information, Qwest “pressure[d]” ENA to subcontract with Qwest.  Bob Collie of ENA, 
however, described the conversation as follows: 
Q.   Do you recall having any discussions with anyone from Qwest 
during that time frame to the effect that ENA considered 
withdrawing its application? 
A.   I was asked that.  I don’t know whether it was in that time 
frame or not. 
Q.   Tell me what you recall about those discussions with Qwest. 
A.   It was in a meeting with a number of participants, of which I 
know Jim Schmit was present, Clint Berry and Greg Zickau, there 
may have been others, though I don’t recall.  And we were asked if 
we would consider withdrawing and enter into a professional 
services contract with Qwest. 
* * *  
Q.   After the proposal was made that ENA withdraw and contract 
with Qwest, did either Mr. Berry or Mr. Schmit ask you to discuss 
that suggestion with your senior management? 
A.   Yes. 
Q.   Did you do that? 
A.   Yes. 
Q.   Who did you talk with? 
A.   I spoke with David Pierce. 
Q.   What did you say to Mr. Pierce? 
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A.   I explained what was offered. 
Q.   What did Mr. Pierce say in response? 
A.   That there was not very much specificity in Qwest’s offer, and 
that given the scoring of the RFPs he didn’t see why it was in 
ENA’s best interest to take that offer. 
Q.   Did you ever communicate back to either Mr. Berry or Mr. 
Schmit that ENA did not wish to pursue their offer? 
A.   I’m sure I did at one point. 
(R. pp. 2428, L. 11 – 2430, L. 11).  Gayle Nelson of ENA described the discussion similarly: 
Q.   As well as you can, please tell me what Jim Schmit said to 
Bob Collie. 
A.   I remember him saying -- because the State had just said that 
they were leaning toward ENA being the named service provider. 
Q.   Uh-huh. 
A.   And Jim said, “Well, I do have one other alternative to 
propose.”  He said, “ENA could withdraw and work as a 
subcontractor through Qwest Services organization.” 
    And after a bit of silence, Bob said, “I will” -- I don’t think Jim 
specifically asked him to take it to senior management.  I think 
Bob said, “We’ll take that under advisement.  I’ll run it by our 
executives, and we’ll get back to you.” 
* * * 
Q.   Do you know what happened at ENA in terms of the proposal 
made by Mr. Schmit? 
A.   Bob talked to David Pierce.  But I don’t -- I didn’t participate 
in that conversation. 
Q.   Do you know what the outcome was of that conversation? 
A.   I know that we weren’t going to withdraw. 
(R. pp. 2432, L. 12 – 2434, L. 4).  There was no “pressure” exerted by Qwest. 
6. Syringa’s Continued Attempts to Obtain the IEN Project After It Was 
Awarded to Qwest 
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Notwithstanding Qwest’s designation as the contractor for all IEN technical network 
services, Syringa continued trying to obtain some or all of the contract that had been awarded to 
Qwest.  In early July 2009, Syringa provided an unsolicited bid for twelve IEN sites to the IEN 
Technical Director, Brady Kraft.3  (R. pp. 1641-49).  Also in July 2009, Syringa’s CEO, Greg 
Lowe, and its lobbyist, Ken McClure, met with Mike Gwartney, the Director of the DOA, and 
three other State employees about the IEN project.4  (R. p. 1540, L. 7-24).  At this meeting, the 
Syringa representatives requested that the State either award ENA the technical network services 
portion of the IEN contract so Syringa could perform those services instead of Qwest, or that the 
state hold a separate bid competition for each school.  (R. p. 1542, L. 11 – 1544, L. 17).  Mr. 
Gwartney denied the request, stating that it would not be fair.  (Id.).  At this time, Qwest had 
already been awarded the technical network services portion of the IEN contract. 
After the meeting, Mr. Gwartney followed up with a letter further outlining the state’s 
reasoning in determining how to divide the IEN project between Qwest and ENA: 
After the initial award, Administration then unilaterally determined how 
best to divide the work between the two awardees/contractors.  
Administration’s determination was based upon the individual strengths 
of each awardees/contractors’ proposals.  For example, ENA had 
expertise in providing E-rate services and providing video 
teleconferencing operations. Qwest had expertise in providing the 
technical operations (ie., the backbone).  Before Amendment 1 to SBPO 
01308 and SBPO 01309 were issued, Administration contemplated 
various ways to divide the responsibilities between Qwest and ENA, 
including but not limited to dividing the services to be provided by 
Qwest and ENA regionally.  However, the division of responsibilities 
reflected in the Amendment 1s is a reflection of what Administration 
believed would best serve the State of Idaho and the schools. 
                                                 
3  (See R. p. 1637 (Office of the CIO – Job Descriptions)). 
4  The deposition questions contained in the transcript excerpts include an error as to the date of 
the meeting.  It was July 16, 2009, not 2010 as the questions indicate. 
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(R. pp. 1651-54, at 1652 (emphasis added)).  When asked about this paragraph at the Rule 30(6) 
deposition of Syringa, its designated representative testified as follows: 
Q.   (BY MR. PERFREMENT):  And do you know whether Qwest in any 
way influenced the Administration to conclude that the division of 
responsibilities reflected in the Amendment 1s best serve the State of 
Idaho and the schools?. . . . 
THE WITNESS:  I do not. 
(R. pp. 1553, L. 1-7).  Qwest also had no involvement in the drafting of the DOA letter advising 
Syringa of the basis for its decision.  (R. p. 1564, ¶ 12; see also R. pp. 1551, L. 3 – 1552, L. 18).  
7. Syringa’s Pre-Litigation Understanding of the Teaming Agreement 
In its Opening Brief, Syringa contends that its Teaming Agreement with ENA “signal[s] 
the parties’ intent to be bound to one another not only for the preparation and submission of 
technical and cost proposals in response to the IEN RFP, but also to perform any resulting state 
contract.”  (Opening Brief at 9).  However, just ten days after the State issued the LOI, Syringa 
became concerned that Qwest might provide the “backbone” portion of the IEN technical 
services.  (R. p. 2418).  In an exchange discussing the Teaming Agreement, former Syringa 
Chief Executive Steve Maloney wrote to current Syringa Chief Executive Greg Lowe that “[a]s I 
recall, the teaming agreement was only good until the award was made and a new agreement 
worked out.”  (R. pp. 2419).  In another exchange later that day, Mr. Lowe advised the Syringa 
Board of Directors that “I still have a teaming agreement with ENA that says we have backbone 
but that agreement is subject to being rewritten upon the award.”   (R. p. 2424).  
II.  ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal in addition to those that Syringa identified 
in its Opening Brief: 
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1. Should the trial court’s fee award to Qwest be affirmed on the alternative grounds 
of Idaho Code § 12-121, under which an attorneys fee award is appropriate when an action was 
pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation? 
2. Is Qwest entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
III.  ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and its 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court.  Curlee v. Kootenai County 
Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008).  “Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006).   
“Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”  
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769  (2009).  The nonmoving party must produce evidence 
“that contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and that establishes the existence 
of a material issue of disputed fact.”  Id.  Moreover, a “‘mere scintilla of evidence or only slight 
doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of 
summary judgment.’”  Wesco Autobody Supply v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 891 (2010). 
Here, Syringa takes general exception to the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment, 
and specific exception to the trial court’s decision not to review hours of videotaped deposition 
testimony and assess the credibility of various witnesses.  The trial court’s correct summary 
judgment ruling in favor of Qwest is addressed according to the standard set forth in Chandler 
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and Lockheed Martin in Sections *** of this brief, infra at ***.  As to the trial court’s decision 
not to assess witness credibility, Syringa challenges the credibility of at least six witnesses in this 
case.  (Opening Brief at 31).  But Syringa “acknowledges that issues of credibility do not 
necessarily attach to the testimony of every witness,” and does not challenge the credibility of 
Jim Schmit and Clint Berry – the only Qwest witnesses to testify in discovery.  (Id.).  Messrs. 
Berry and Schmit are the only persons claimed to have unduly influenced State officials, and 
they unequivocally deny having done so.  (R. pp. 1561-75).  Their testimony is not contested. 
Moreover, the cases on which Syringa relies do not stand for the proposition that a trial 
court must sift through hours of video testimony and delve into issues of witness credibility at 
the behest of litigants.  In Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470 (Ct. App. 1985), the trial court 
was presented conflicting evidence regarding the hazard presented by a stray bull shot by its 
owners’ neighbor.  The defendants’ direct evidence, if accepted, supported the conclusion that 
the bull posed a danger; the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence that the defendant had previously 
threatened to shoot intruding animals, if accepted, supported an inference that the bull was shot 
simply because it intruded on the defendants’ property.  Id.  Since “a party resisting a motion for 
summary judgment is entitled to a favorable view of conflicting evidence,” the court held that 
summary judgment was not appropriate.  Id. 
Similarly, in Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984), documentary 
evidence indicating that a property description had been attached to a deed when it was signed 
and delivered conflicted with testimonial evidence that the description was absent when the 
grantor signed and delivered the deed.  Since the conflict in the evidence could not be resolved 
without considering the affiant’s credibility, summary judgment was inappropriate.  Id. 
Here, there is no conflicting evidence.  Instead, Syringa simply asserts that the testimony 
of various State and ENA witnesses – but not the Qwest witnesses – although uncontested, is too 
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incomplete to be credible.  But the trial court cannot weigh the credibility of witnesses in 
summary judgment proceedings.  Syringa has an obligation to present evidence supporting an 
inference that witnesses lack credibility, not suggestion and innuendo.  If there is no conflict in 
the evidence, there is no material issue of disputed fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That There Are No Material Issues Of 
Disputed Fact And The Evidence Does Not Support Syringa’s Claim For Tortious 
Interference Claims Against Qwest 
Count Four of Syringa’s Complaint alleges that Qwest intentionally interfered with the 
Teaming Agreement between ENA and Qwest by pursuing the IEN project.  Count Five of 
Syringa’s Complaint similarly alleges that Qwest also wrongfully interfered with Syringa’s 
“prospective economic advantage” in the IEN project by pursuing the opportunity itself.  Syringa 
failed to support these claims.  After substantial written and testimonial discovery, the record is 
bereft of any evidence that Qwest improperly influenced state officials with respect to the IEN 
contract award.  To the contrary, Qwest did nothing tortious or otherwise improper with respect 
to the IEN project.  The uncontested evidence establishes that (1) Qwest and ENA submitted 
responses to the IEN RFP; (2) Qwest and ENA were each awarded an IEN contract; (3) the DOA 
solicited recommendations from ENA and Qwest as to how to allocate the responsibilities for the 
IEN project; (4) the DOA unilaterally determined how it would allocate responsibilities for the 
IEN project between Qwest and ENA; and (5) the DOA then issued amended purchase orders to 
reflect that allocation.   Although Qwest sought overall responsibility for the project, Qwest was 
awarded only the network technical services portion.  ENA was awarded the rest, and the parties 
were instructed to work together to create the IEN network.  There is no evidence to support 
Syringa’s claim that some sort of conspiracy caused this allocation. 
1. The Undisputed Material Facts Show That Qwest Did Not Tortiously 
Interfere with Any Contract. 
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To establish a prima facie case of tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must 
prove: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant, 
(3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and (4) injury to the plaintiff 
resulting from the breach.  Bybee v. Isaac, 178 P.3d 616, 624 (Idaho 2008); Barlow v. Int’l 
Harvester, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (Idaho 1974).  Assuming that the plaintiff can establish 
intentional interference by the defendant causing a breach of contract, liability only arises from 
improper interference with a contract.  Beco Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng’rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 
723 (2008) (citing Jensen v. Westberg, 772 P.2d 228, 234 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A, cmt. e (1977))).  If the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case, then the defendant must establish justification.  Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 858 (Idaho 1991).  The undisputed material facts make clear that 
Syringa failed to establish a prima facie case of tortious interference with contract here. 
(a) The trial court applied the correct standard and correctly allocated 
the burden of proof. 
Syringa’s initial assertion that the trial court “applied the wrong standard and 
misallocated the burden of proof by stating that Syringa failed to prove improper or wrongful 
conduct as to Syringa’s interference with contract claim” is incorrect.  (Opening Brief at 55).  
Whether the claim is tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct was “improper” to 
establish a prima facie case.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. a, § 766A, cmt. a., 
§ 766B, cmt. a.  The trial court correctly concluded that there is no claim for tortious interference 
with contract in the absence of wrongful conduct, and that Syringa had failed to present evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Qwest engaged in any improper or 
wrongful conduct causing a breach of contract.  (R. pp. 2591-92). 
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(b) The Teaming Agreement is not a valid contract under Idaho law 
because it is merely an agreement to agree. 
The first element of a claim for tortious interference with contract is the existence of a 
contract.  Bybee, 178 P.3d at 624.  Syringa alleges that it was party to a Teaming Agreement with 
ENA, and that Qwest interfered with that contract by causing the DOA to award Qwest the 
technical network portion of the IEN contract.  However, the Teaming Agreement is not a 
contract and therefore cannot provide a basis for a tortious interference claim.  
A contract must be “sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that 
it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete.”  
Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (Idaho 2010) (internal 
citation omitted).  “Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable, as its terms are so 
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable obligation.”  Maroun v. 
Wyreless Sys., 114 P.3d 974, 984 (Idaho 2005).  No contract “comes into being when parties 
leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree.”  Id.; Spokane 
Structures, 226 P.3d at 1268 (emphasis added).  “In order for a contract to be formed, there must 
be a meeting of the minds on all material terms to the contract.”  Univ. of Idaho Found., Inc. v. 
Civic Partners, Inc., 199 P.3d 102, 111 (Idaho 2008) (emphasis added). 
In Spokane Structures, the parties executed a document entitled “Design/Build 
Agreement” that set forth the work to be performed in the design and construction of an office 
and warehouse.  226 P.3d at 1264.  In the Design/Build Agreement, “Spokane Structures, Inc. 
agree[d] to design, engineer, and draft plans in preparation of all documents/drawings required to 
enable the owner and contractor to agree on a final design and cost of construction to be 
performed.”  Id.  The district court held that the Design/Build Agreement was a contract, but this 
Court reversed, noting that “the parties left for future agreement both the plans and specifications 
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describing the scope of the work to be done and the contract price, which were essential, 
interrelated terms.”  Id. at 1268.  Therefore, the parties had not formed a contract.  Id.  
In a case involving a Teaming Agreement similar to the one at issue here, the court in  
Trianco, LLC v. IBM, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7117 (3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (unpublished), 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a breach of contract claim.  Although Trianco, is 
unpublished and from another jurisdiction, its factual similarity to the present case makes it informative. 
Under the Trianco Teaming Agreement, IBM was responsible for preparing the bid 
proposal for the prime contract.  Id. at *2.  Subcontractor Trianco agreed to submit “cost/price” 
and “technical” proposals for subcontract work to IBM and assist in drafting the bid, 
collaborating exclusively with IBM.  Id. at *4.  If IBM were awarded the prime contract, the 
parties were then obligated to negotiate in good faith mutually acceptable terms and conditions 
of a subcontract.  Id. at *5.  After being awarded the prime contract, IBM asked Trianco to “re-
bid” its initial pricing and solicited an alternative bid for the subcontract work.  Id. 
Although the Trianco Teaming Agreement provided that “[u]pon award to IBM of a 
prime contract for the [Project], IBM will award a subcontract to Trianco,” the court found that 
IBM’s promise to grant a subcontract, subject to the parties’ future agreement on its terms, 
conditions, and pricing, was merely an agreement to agree and not a contract: 
While the Teaming Agreement provided that Trianco “will” and “shall” be 
awarded a subcontract, a material term of that promise was missing – 
namely, the price that IBM would pay Trianco for performing the 
subcontract. The agreement also contains no method for determining this 
price. While the Teaming Agreement states that Trianco will have a right 
of first refusal to reject the subcontract if it submitted “competitive 
pricing,” the Teaming Agreement also does not define the term 
“competitive” nor does it refer to any extrinsic method for determining 
whether Trianco’s pricing was, in fact, “competitive.”  
 
We are also not persuaded by Trianco’s assertion that IBM accepted its 
pricing as competitive when it submitted its bid to the Government. 
Nothing in the Teaming Agreement states that Trianco’s proposed pricing, 
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when submitted by IBM to the Government, would constitute a definitive 
or even an approximate basis for determining Trianco’s price. Again, 
while the doctrine of definiteness is not a rigid concept, there must be 
some objective  method for supplying a missing material term. No such 
method existed here.  
Id. at *8-9 (footnote and citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. Le 
Chase Constr. Servs., LLC, 819 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (subcontractor’s pricing 
proposals to the prime contractor to secure a bid did not supply the missing price term). 
Under the Teaming Agreement, Syringa and ENA left for future negotiations and 
agreement critical terms of any future relationship.  Specifically, ENA and Syringa provided that 
“[i]f ENA or Syringa are awarded the Prime Contract [for the IEN project], ENA and Syringa 
shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which Syringa shall provide connectivity services 
statewide to ENA.”  (R. p. 1555, § 2(2).  As the Rule 30(6) representative of Syringa testified, 
the Teaming Agreement addressed the “workflow” or “division of labor” between ENA and 
Syringa should ENA be awarded the IEN contract.  (R. pp. 1546, L. 6 – 1548, L. 7).  However, 
Syringa and ENA never entered into any agreement with respect to order entry, billing, and other 
logistical terms associated with their relationship.  (R. p. 1548, L. 1-7).  Given the complexity of 
the IEN project, such matters cannot be considered immaterial.   
Perhaps more importantly, the Teaming Agreement failed to address how the two 
signatories would divide the $571,000 aggregate monthly recurring charge the state would pay 
under the bid.  That was left to subsequent negotiations: 
Q. . . . .  And if I understand your testimony correctly, there is 
not within this Teaming Agreement a division of money? 
A. There is not the logistics of how all of that would work. 
Q. And at the time you entered into this Teaming Agreement, 
how did you expect that to be worked out? 
A. In subsequent negotiations upon winning.  We knew what 
things cost.  We didn’t know the way the money would flow. 
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Q. Did you at any time enter into a second contract with ENA 
delineating how the money would flow? 
A. We did not. 
(R. p. 1547, L. 11-25).  By failing to decide how any money received for the IEN project would 
be divided, ENA and Syringa failed to agree on the price for their respective services.  To 
determine whether ENA and Syringa “[left] a material term for future negotiations, creating a 
mere agreement to agree,” Maroun, 114 P.3d at 984, the Court need only consider a single 
question.  If ENA had been awarded the entire IEN contract, how much would Syringa have 
been paid?  No one knows.  That is fatal to Syringa’s contention.  Where the parties leave open 
such an essential term there is no contract.  Spokane Structures, 226 P.3d at 1268.   
The cases Syringa relies upon do not support a contrary conclusion.  In EG&G, Inc. v. 
The Cube Corp., 63 Va. Cir. 634 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002) (cited in Opening Brief at 39), the parties 
entered into a Teaming Agreement before the relevant Request for Proposals was issued.  After 
the prime contract was awarded, they entered into ten “Letter Subcontracts” memorializing all 
material terms of their agreement and commenced performance.  Id. at 636, 640-641, 641 n.31.  
In Virginia, the essential terms of a contract include “1) the nature and scope of the work to be 
performed, [and] 2) the compensation to be paid for that work,” and the court found that the 
parties had not only reached agreement on these terms, but all services contemplated under the 
agreement had thus far been performed and paid for as agreed.  Id. at 648 n.62.  Therefore, no 
material terms had been left for future agreement, and a contract was formed.  See id. at 651-52. 
The court in ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communs., 155 F.3d 659, 667 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(cited in Opening Brief at 38-39, 41), is similarly unhelpful.  In that case, the court applied 
Pennsylvania law, under which “the omission of an essential term in a contract, such as price, 
does not vitiate contract formation. . . .”  Id. at 667.  Under Idaho law, however, the scope of the 
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work to be done and the contract price are essential terms without which a contract has not been 
formed.  Spokane Structures, 226 P.3d at 1268.   
Moreover, in ATACS, the parties did not “indicate that the terms of their teaming 
agreement were subject to final execution of the subcontract.”  ATACS, 155 F.3d at 668.  Here, 
the Teaming Agreement expressly acknowledged that ENA and Syringa would need to enter into 
a subcontract agreement under which Syringa would provide services to ENA if it were awarded 
the IEN contract.  (R. p. 1555, Ex. 6, § 2(a); see also R. p. 1556, § 3(a)).  Before this lawsuit 
arose, Syringa’s CEO also conceded that the Teaming Agreement “is subject to being rewritten 
upon the award” of the IEN project.  (R. p. 2424; see also R. p. 2419 (“the teaming agreement 
was only good until the award was made and a new agreement worked out.”)). 
In addition, even if the Teaming Agreement were and enforceable contract, it terminated 
by its terms when the State rejected – twice – the IEN Alliance’s proposal.  This defect in 
Syringa’s claims is addressed in detail in Section III.B.2.b of ENA’s Amended Response Brief, 
at 22-25, and Qwest incorporates that argument by reference under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g). 
For these reasons, the Teaming Agreement is merely an agreement to agree and not a 
contract.  Because Syringa cannot establish the existence a contract with which Qwest allegedly 
interfered, its tortious interference with contract claim should be dismissed. 
(c) Even if the Teaming Agreement were a valid contract, Qwest did not 
interfere with it or cause ENA not to perform. 
The second essential element in a claim for tortious interference with a contract is proof 
that the defendant engaged in “intentional interference causing a breach of the contract” at issue.  
Bybee, 178 P.3d at 624.  Here, Syringa does not allege that Qwest influenced ENA to abandon a 
contract with Syringa.  Instead, Syringa alleges that Qwest influenced the DOA, and this 
influence had collateral consequences for Syringa’s alleged agreement with ENA.  The evidence 
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is undisputed, however, that Qwest did nothing to influence or induce the DOA to award Qwest 
the technical network portion of the IEN contract other than submit a bid. 
After the DOA issued the dual award to ENA and Qwest, the DOA specifically asked 
Qwest (and ENA) to provide suggestions and recommendations regarding IEN implementation.  
(R. pp. 1597, L. 22 – 1598, L. 14, 1604, L. 14 – 1605, L. 6).  Qwest then sent the State its written 
recommendation that Qwest be the designated IEN network provider, with ENA providing 
certain training, filing assistance and application support.  The DOA essentially ignored Qwest’s 
recommendation.  (R. pp. 1597, L. 14 – 1599, L. 8).  In fact, the DOA instead designated ENA as 
the service provider for the IEN project and placed ENA in charge of “coordinat[ing] overall 
delivery of all IEN network services and support,” with Qwest designated as the “general 
contractor for all IEN technical network services.”  (R. pp. 1626 ¶ 1, 1631 ¶¶ 1-2). 
Moreover, the DOA “unilaterally determined how best to divide the work between the 
two awardees/contractors . . . based upon the individual strengths of each awardees/contractors’ 
proposals . . . [and] what Administration believed would best serve the State of Idaho and the 
schools.”  (R. pp. 1651-54, at 1652).  There is no evidence that Qwest influenced the State’s 
division of responsibilities between ENA and Qwest.  (R. pp. 1553, L. 1-7). 
Nevertheless, Syringa suggests that there must have been a conspiracy between State 
employee Mike Gwartney and Qwest because of testimony by Qwest employee Clint Berry that 
he “knew all along we [Qwest] were going to be providing connectivity.”  (Opening Brief at 15, 
53,-54 (citing R. Conf. p. 440, Berry Dep. p. 163, L. 5 – p. 165, L. 12)).  Syringa attempts to use 
this testimony to establish that Mr. Berry knew, before an award was announced, that Qwest 
would receive an IEN contract.  (See, e.g., Opening Brief p. 54 (asserting that “Mr. Gwartney 
and Mr. Berry knew on January 16, 2009 that Qwest was going to get the connectivity work no 
matter how the proposals were ranked”)).  Syringa may be entitled to reasonable inferences, but 
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it cannot make up facts.  The record contains no evidence – none – to support Syringa’s 
conjecture that Qwest had substantive discussions with someone at the State, perhaps Mr. 
Gwartney, between the day the RFP was issued and the date of the award.   
To the contrary, the evidence establishes that between December 15, 2008 (the day the 
RFP was issued) and January 20, 2009 (when the LOI was issued), no representative of Qwest 
initiated any communications or attempted to influence anyone associated with the Idaho state 
government regarding the RFP.   (R. p. 1563, ¶ 6; R. p. 1569, ¶ 6; R. pp. 1574, L. 2 – 1575, L. 6).  
The only communications between Qwest and the State during this period for which there is any 
evidence, as opposed to conjecture, were Qwest’s participation in a bidders conference in 
December 2008, and the DOA’s request that Qwest provide a signature page for its RFP 
response that matched the one provided in the RFP package.  (R. pp. 1474-77, 1563, ¶ 6, 1569, 
¶ 6).  Even in the days immediately following the DOA’s issuance of the LOI awarding contracts 
to ENA and Qwest, Qwest’s sole contact with the DOA was a single request by Qwest employee 
to meet to discuss the IEN project over coffee.  (R. p. 1569, ¶ 7). 
Moreover, Mr. Gwartney testified that he only spoke with State employees –  Luna, 
Zickau, and State attorney Melissa Vandenberg – about the State’s decision to split the award 
between ENA and Qwest.  (R. Conf. p. 371, Gwartney Dep. pp. 259, L. 4 – 260, L. 3).  Mr. 
Gwartney did not recall having any discussions with Qwest about the IEN before January 30, 
2009.  (R. Conf. p. 94, Gwartney Dep. pp. 219, L. 3-8; R. Conf. p. 373, Gwartney Dep. pp. 279, 
L. 23 – 280, L. 1; R. Conf. p. 374, Gwartney Dep. pp. 284, L. 9-13).  
As to Mr. Berry’s testimony that he “knew all along that we were going to be providing 
connectivity,” Syringa wrenched the testimony from its context to support a false impression of 
conspiratorial conduct.  (Opening Brief pp. 15, 53-54).  The entire context of the testimony 
involved discussions “between January 28th and February 15th” among Messrs. Berry and 
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Schmit of Qwest and Ms. Luna, Ms. Hill, and Mr. Zickau at the State.  (R. Conf. pp. 438-39, 
Berry Dep. p. 156, L. 21 – p. 159, L. 8)).  Mr. Gwartney was not even part of the conversation: 
Q. Who besides Laura Hill and Greg Zickau did you talk to 
about selection of the SPIN, the E-rate provider? 
A. I believe Teresa Luna was in those, at least one of those 
meetings as well. I would say those three individuals represent the 
leadership of the Department of Administration at the time. 
(R. Conf. p. 438, Berry Dep. p. 156, L. 21 – p. 159, L. 8).  When these conversations took place, 
Qwest had already been awarded a contract to provide connectivity for the IEN.  It cannot be 
suspicious that Mr. Berry expected Qwest to provide connectivity for the IEN after that award. 
Under such circumstances, it is impossible to conclude that Qwest influenced or induced 
ENA to breach a contract with Syringa.  It is also impossible to conclude that Qwest somehow 
influenced or induced the DOA to cause ENA to breach a contract with Syringa.  There is no 
record evidence to support such speculation, let alone prove it.   
(d) Even if Qwest had interfered with the Teaming Agreement, Qwest 
was competing with ENA for the business of a third party, the State, 
and cannot be liable for tortious interference absent improper means. 
The evidence establishes that the primary thing Qwest did after receiving the IEN 
contract award is respond to the DOA’s request for a recommendation as to how to allocate 
responsibilities for the project between ENA and Qwest.  Therefore, in essence, Syringa’s claim 
is that Qwest should have stood idly by while ENA acquired the entirety of the IEN project for 
ENA and Syringa, even after Qwest had been awarded an equal share of it.  The law does not 
impose such an obligation.   
“One does not induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person under 
the rule stated in this Section when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with 
knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract with the third person. . . .”  
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. n (1977).5  Qwest’s agreement is with the DOA, 
not ENA.  And the DOA unilaterally allocated the award between Qwest and ENA.  (R. pp. 
1651-54, at 1652).  Qwest cannot be found to have induced ENA to breach any agreement with 
Syringa merely by performing Qwest’s separate agreement with the State. 
(e) Even if Qwest had interfere with the Teaming Agreement, its 
interference would not be improper.  
Even if Qwest had interfered with the Teaming Agreement, its interference would not be 
improper.  Section 767 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977) identifies several factors 
courts consider in determining whether interference with a contract is improper:  
In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with 
a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or 
not, consideration is given to the following factors: 
(a)  the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
 
(b)  the actor’s motive, 
 
(c)  the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct 
interferes, 
 
(d)  the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
 
(e)  the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the 
actor and the contractual interests of the other, 
 
(f)  the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the 
interference and 
 
(g)  the relations between the parties. 
See Beco Constr. Co., 184 P.3d at 848 (applying the Section 767 factors).  Consideration of the 
relevant factors and the undisputed evidence makes clear that Qwest’s conduct was not improper. 
                                                 
5 This Court relied upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 and its associated 
comments for its analysis in Wesco Autobody Supply v. Ernest, 243 P.3d 1069, 894 (Idaho 2010). 
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“The nature of the actor’s conduct is a chief factor in determining whether the conduct is 
improper or not, despite its harm to the other person. . . .  The issue is not simply whether the 
actor is justified in causing the harm, but rather whether he is justified in causing it in the manner 
in which he does cause it.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c.  Examples of 
conduct that may be impermissible include threats of physical violence, fraudulent 
misrepresentations, litigation and the threat of litigation, criminal prosecution or the threat of 
prosecution, conduct in violation of statutory provisions or contrary to established public policy, 
conduct in violation of the antitrust laws, the exertion of economic pressure, or a violation of 
recognized business ethics.  Id.  Not one of these factors is even remotely present here. 
Syringa’s claim is premised almost entirely on Qwest’s responding to the DOA’s request 
that Qwest provide a recommendation as to how responsibilities for the IEN project should be 
allocated between ENA and Qwest, and then accepting the portion of the work that Qwest was 
offered.  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS notes that “[t]he question of who was the 
moving party in the inducement may also be important.  A’s active solicitation of B’s business is 
more likely to make his interference improper than his mere response to an inquiry from B.”  § 
767 cmt. c.  Section 772 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS also specifically provides that 
“[o]ne who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a 
prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s 
contractual relation, by giving the third person . . . honest advice within the scope of a request for 
the advice.”  Under this rule, it is immaterial that the actor may profit by the advice.  Id. cmt. c.   
The evidence is undisputed that the DOA solicited Qwest’s recommendation regarding 
the division of responsibilities between ENA and Qwest after the DOA awarded both of them an 
IEN contract.  Ms. Hill testified that the DOA “asked both the primes [ENA and Qwest] to come 
back with suggestions to the draft strategic visions that we had” with respect to IEN 
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implementation, and then asked the Qwest representatives to put “their concerns and their 
recommendations” in writing.  (R. p. 1597-98, Hill Dep. pp. 163, L. 22 – 164, L. 14, see also R. 
pp. 1604-05, Hill Dep. 180, L. 14 – 181, L. 6).  Qwest cannot be liable to Syringa for responding 
to a request by the State regarding a contract Qwest was awarded. 
Moreover, in considering whether Qwest did anything improper, it is helpful to consider 
the conduct of other parties.  ENA did far more to advance the cause of the IEN Alliance than 
Qwest did on its own behalf.  Immediately after the DOA issued its LOI, ENA met repeatedly 
with DOA officials responsible for the IEN project.  (R. pp. 1581-82).  ENA, not Qwest, offered 
the DOA unsolicited free filing assistance for the project while “working up a draft teaming 
agreement, with ENA as the Lead, supported by two subcontractors, Qwest and Syringa,” and “a 
proposed governance model, where ENA would serve as the overall lead and responsible entity 
for this network.”  (R. p. 1579).  Qwest did not offer similar inducements or engage in such 
conduct, particularly during the five-day bid protest period. 
Syringa’s conduct offers even more contrast.  Syringa continued to lobby state officials 
even after Qwest was awarded the technical network services portion of the IEN contract.  As 
late as July 2009, Syringa and its lobbyist met with the DOA and attempted to persuade the State 
to award ENA the technical network services portion of the IEN contract so Syringa could 
perform those services instead of Qwest.  (R. pp. 1540-44, Lowe Dep. pp. 137, L. 7 – 142, L. 
17).  And Syringa even submitted an unsolicited bid for a dozen IEN sites to the IEN Technical 
Director in an attempt to take that business that had been awarded to Qwest.  (R. pp. 1641-49).  
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the record evidence is that Qwest 
and Syringa were each acting in their own economic self-interest in pursuing the IEN project.  
Unlike “[a] motive to injure another or to vent one’s ill will on him,” which “serves no socially 
useful purpose,” Qwest had a valid economic purpose in maximizing its IEN award.  
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d, § 766 cmt. j.  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS specifically recognizes that where “the actor’s interest will be economic, seeking to 
acquire business for himself,” the interest “is important and will normally prevail over a similar 
interest of the other if the actor does not use wrongful means.”  § 767 cmt. f.  And once Qwest 
was awarded at least some of the IEN project, Qwest’s economic interest in the project was 
“consolidated into the binding legal obligation of a contract,” an interest that “will normally 
outweigh [another] actor’s own interest in taking that established right from [it].”  Id.   
Finally, even if Qwest had influenced the DOA to allocate the technical network services 
portion of the IEN contract to Qwest, Qwest would have been within its rights to do so: 
If the actor is not acting criminally nor with fraud or violence or other 
means wrongful in themselves but is endeavoring to advance some interest 
of his own, the fact that he is aware that he will cause interference with the 
plaintiff’s contract may be regarded as such a minor and incidental 
consequence and so far removed from the defendant’s objective that as 
against the plaintiff the interference may be found to be not improper. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j.  There is no evidence that Qwest engaged in 
fraud, violence, or other wrongful means to induce the DOA to bar Syringa from the IEN project. 
(f) Even if Qwest had interfere with the Teaming Agreement, its 
interference would be justified as a matter of law. 
In asserting that Qwest would not be justified in interfering with Syringa’s contract with 
ENA, Syringa assumes what there is no evidence to prove – the existence of some sort of 
conspiracy between Qwest and someone at the State.  (Opening Brief at 56).  Yet Syringa cannot 
identify any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Qwest “conspire[d] 
with” the State, “attempt[ed] to deprive a vendor of an acquisition award,” or “interfere[d] with 
the public bidding process.”  (See Opening Brief at 56).  All of the conduct Syringa has 
identified – meeting with State personnel and ENA, discussing the IEN project, and Qwest’s 
offering its view as to the manner in which it should be divided – occurred after Qwest was 
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awarded a contract.  As described previously, where the actor’s interest is economic, seeking to 
acquire business for itself, that interest “will normally prevail over a similar interest of the other 
if the actor does not use wrongful means.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS specifically 
recognizes that § 767 cmt. f.  Qwest had no obligation to subordinate its interests to Syringa’s, 
especially where Qwest had been awarded an IEN contract and Syringa had not. 
2. Summary Judgment Was properly Granted on Count Five Because There Is 
No Evidence Indicating that Qwest Tortiously Interfered with Syringa’s 
Prospective Business Advantage. 
To establish a prima facie case for tortious interference with a prospective economic 
advantage, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, 
(2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference 
inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure 
beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper 
purpose or improper means), and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has 
been disrupted.  Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. Lynn Lea Family Trust, 177 P.3d 955, 964 
(Idaho 2008) (quoting Highland Enters. v. Barker, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (Idaho 1999)).  Wrongful 
means include conduct that violates a statute or regulatory prescription, a recognized rule of 
common law, such as violence, threats of other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, 
or disparaging falsehood, or an established standard of trade or profession.  Idaho First Nat’l 
Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 860 & 861 n.16 (Idaho 1991). 
As with tortious interference with contract, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that its conduct was privileged.  Bliss, 824 P.2d at 
861.  Privilege only becomes relevant, however, when “the interference would be wrongful but 
for the privilege; it becomes an issue only if the facts charged would be tortious on the part of an 
unprivileged defendant.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
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For purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment below, Qwest assumed that Syringa 
could establish the existence of a valid economic expectancy, knowledge of the expectancy by 
Qwest, and damages.  The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Qwest’s favor 
because Syringa failed to establish wrongful interference by Qwest with any business expectancy 
and any interference clearly would be privileged. 
(a) Qwest did not interfere with any economic expectancy of Syringa. 
As discussed previously, there is no evidence that Qwest influenced or induced ENA not 
to do business with Syringa, or influenced or induced the DOA to award Qwest the technical 
network portion of the IEN contract other than by submitting a bid.  Syringa nevertheless asserts 
that one can infer that Qwest engaged in intentional interference causing a breach of the Teaming 
Agreement between ENA and Syringa because Qwest participated in meetings with State 
employees “that were followed by the exclusion of Syringa from the IEN.”  (Opposition at 11).  
“After and therefore because of” is a classic logical fallacy that has long held to be 
insufficient to raise a reasonable inference of causation.  For example, this Court has made clear 
that causation cannot rest on the “logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this and 
therefore because of it),” even at the pleading stage.  Spur Prods. Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 
Idaho 41, 48 (2005).  Instead, there must be facts “to support the conclusion that the latter was 
‘caused’ by the former and therefore resulted in damage.”  Id.; see also Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 
613 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (excluding expert causation testimony  as a “‘post hoc ergo 
propter hoc’ fallacy which . . . makes an assumption based on the false inference that a temporal 
relationship proves a causal relationship”); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 
1243 (11th Cir. 2005) (Inferring causation from “temporal relationships leads to the blunder of 
the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.”); Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs. v. Lake County, Ill., 424 
F.3d 659, 669 (7th Cir. 2005) (“As Roger sees it, the [challenged act could only have been 
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retaliation], and thus his case must proceed to trial.  This is a classic post hoc ergo propter hoc 
ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. . . .  But to defeat summary judgment, Roger must present 
something by which a jury could connect the dots between the propter and the post. . . .”).  
Syringa offers no facts by which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that meetings between 
Qwest and the State caused Syringa to be excluded from the IEN project. 
It cannot be inherently improper for Qwest to meet with State employees about the IEN 
project.  Such an inference would be absurd.  Qwest was awarded a contract to provide services 
for the IEN project.  If meeting with the State after being awarded a State contract were 
considered “evidence” of misconduct, every State contractor would be at risk of being accused of 
tortious interference by any other contractor who failed to receive subcontract work. 
Syringa’s assertion that no one remember these meetings is also incorrect.  (Opening 
Brief at 17, 19-20).  For example, as to one key meeting former State employee Laura Hill 
testified about who attended, where they sat, and what the Qwest representatives said.  (R. pp. 
2076-79, Hill Dep. pp. 105, L. 7 – 108, L. 17, 110, L. 9 – 114, L. 20).  Ms. Hill did not have 
much to say about Qwest, however, because Qwest did not have much to say at the meeting: 
Q.   So what did the representatives from Qwest say during that meeting? 
A.   Not much.  
(R. p. 2078, Hill Dep. p. 113, L. 1-3). 
Syringa also asserts that Teresa Luna, former Chief of Staff to former DOA Director 
Mike Gwartney, cannot recall the content of certain meetings between Qwest and the State, and 
suggests that an inference of misconduct must be drawn from her alleged lack of memory.  
(Opening Brief at 21).  However, when asked specifically about Qwest’s input at the meetings, 
Ms. Luna made clear that Qwest did not exert any influence over the State: 
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Q.   Well, at the meeting on February 7, 2009, did Mr. Schmit and Mr. 
Berry persuade you that the contract for the IEN should be split so that one 
provider, ENA, if they became the E-rate provider, would handle E-rate 
and they would handle the rest? 
A.   No. 
(R. pp. 2085-87, Luna Dep. pp. 109, L. 19 – 110, L. 16; 114-117 (objections omitted)).  No 
adverse inferences against Qwest can be drawn from such testimony. 
 Syringa also asserts that the missing link may be provided by inference because Qwest 
sent a document to State personnel that would have designated Qwest as the general contractor, 
and Syringa suggests that this document “was used as a template for preparation of the amended 
SBPOs.”  (Opening Brief at 22, 24; see also id. at 57).  The author of the document, however, 
specifically testified that she did not use the proposed amendment provided by Qwest.  (R. pp. 
1600-03, Hill Dep. at 176, L. 9 – 179, L. 11).  Ultimately, the DOA “unilaterally determined how 
best to divide the work between the two awardees/contractors.”  (R. p. 1652).  And the State 
ultimately did the opposite of what Qwest suggested, designating ENA as the overall service 
provider for the IEN project, with Qwest acting as ENA’s sub-contractor for IEN network 
services.  (R. p. 1626, ¶¶ 1-2; R. 1631, ¶¶ 1-2).  There is no evidence from which a reasonable 
fact-finder could infer that Qwest induced the DOA to use Qwest for technical network services.  
(b) Any interference by Qwest was not “wrongful.” 
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Even assuming that Syringa could prove that Qwest interfered with Syringa’s ability to 
participate in the IEN project and caused the DOA to terminate an expectancy, it must further 
show that Qwest engaged in conduct that would be wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of 
the interference itself.  Commercial Ventures, 177 P.3d at 964.  Interference is wrongful if the 
defendant: (1) had an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) used wrongful 
means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship.  Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. 
Ernest, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Idaho 2010).   
Wrongful means include breach of fiduciary duty, conduct in violation of a statute, 
regulation, or recognized rule of common law, violence, threats of other intimidation, deceit, 
misrepresentation, bribery, or disparaging falsehood, or conduct in violation an established 
standard of trade or profession.  Wesco, 243 P.3d at 1089; Quality Res. & Servs. v. Idaho Power 
Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1100-01 (D. Idaho 2010).  Absent proof of an improper objective or 
wrongful means, a plaintiff cannot support a claim for interference with prospective business. 
For example, in Quality Resource, the plaintiff agency provided temporary contract 
workers to the defendant, a utility.  After an RFP process, the defendant selected an alternative 
company as its primary supplier of temporary labor, and informed existing contract workers they 
would be dismissed unless they joined the new supplier.  706 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93.  Six 
workers then left plaintiff, joined the new agency, and continued to work for defendant.  Id.  
Although the plaintiff had shown the existence of a valid economic expectancy, knowledge of 
the expectancy on the part of the defendant, and intentional interference inducing termination of 
the expectancy, the court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant.  The court concluded 
that the defendant’s interference was not accomplished by wrongful means because, among other 
things, (1) the defendant did not breach the parties’ agreement by contacting the plaintiff’s 
employees directly regarding their employment; (2) the defendant did not force employees to 
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join the new contractor through any threats, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, bribery, or 
disparaging falsehood; and (3) the defendant did not violate an established standard of trade or 
profession.  Id. at 1100-01.  Moreover, when advising the employees that they would have to 
move to the new agency or be dismissed, the defendant was acting on behalf of a competitor. 
There is no evidence that Qwest engaged in any wrongful conduct.  In the absence of 
evidence showing that Qwest’s conduct was wrongful (beyond the fact of any alleged 
interference itself), Syringa’s claim was properly dismissed.  Lexington Heights Dev. v. 
Crandlemire, 92 P.3d 526, 536 (Idaho 2004) (dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for tortious 
interference with prospective economic advantage was proper because plaintiff did not explain 
how the conduct was wrongful or point to evidence in the record supporting its allegation). 
(c) Qwest’s conduct with respect to the IEN project is privileged under 
the business competition privilege. 
Even if Syringa could prove that Qwest intentionally and wrongfully interfered with a 
business expectancy of Syringa, any such interference was privileged.  Competitors are 
privileged to interfere with prospective contractual relationships under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 768 (1977), which provides:  
(1)  One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a 
prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor 
or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not 
interfere improperly with the other’s relation if 
(a)  the relation concerns a matter involved in the 
competition between the actor and the other and 
 
(b)  the actor does not employ wrongful means and 
 
(c)  his action does not create or continue an 
unlawful restraint of trade and 
 
(d)  his purpose is at least in part to advance his 
interest in competing with the other. 
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(2)  The fact that one is a competitor of another for the business of 
a third person does not prevent his causing a breach of an existing 
contract with the other from being an improper interference if the 
contract is not terminable at will. 
See Frantz v. Parke, 729 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the defendant’s 
conduct was privileged because he was competing for patients, his purpose in asking patients to 
visit his new office was to advance his position in the market, and he did not use wrongful 
means, even though he solicited patients and used the plaintiff’s patient lists); see also Quality 
Resource, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16036 at *36-37 (holding that the defendant’s purpose of 
inducing plaintiff’s at-will employees to transfer to a competitor was not improper). 
Any interference by Qwest was privileged.  The requirement that “the [prospective 
contractual] relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the 
other” is met where the “business diverted from the competitor relates to the competition 
between [the competitor] and the actor.”  See Quality Resource, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 cmt. d).  Here, the business allegedly diverted from 
Syringa was the technical services portion of the IEN contract, which is the business for which 
Qwest submitted a proposal in response to the RFP.  Moreover, Qwest’s actions in competing for 
the IEN contract were aimed at advancing its own economic interests, rather than at harming 
Syringa.  Because each of the factors under § 768(1) are met here, any interference by Qwest 
with Syringa’s prospective contractual relation was privileged.    
C. The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Qwest Its Attorneys Fees, Because The 
Gravamen Of This Dispute Is A Commercial Transaction and Syringa Pursued 
Frivolous and Groundless Claims Against Qwest 
1. The Fee Award was Appropriate under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
The trial court correctly awarded Qwest its attorney fees for the defense of this case 
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), which provides: 
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In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to 
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the Court, to be taxed and collected as 
costs. 
The term “commercial transaction” is defined to mean all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes. . . . 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (emphasis added.) 
Qwest is the prevailing party here, and a commercial transaction was integral to 
Plaintiff’s claims.  At its core, Syringa’s Complaint alleges that it entered into a Teaming 
Agreement with ENA through which Syringa and ENA submitted a bid to develop the IEN, but 
Qwest interfered with that commercial opportunity, resulting in Qwest’s securing the network 
services portion of the contract instead of Syringa.  The commercial transaction with the State is 
integral to Plaintiff’s claims against Qwest, giving rise to a right to recover fees.   
In Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110-11 (Idaho 2005), the 
defendant bank was properly awarded fees spent defending against claims for breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and fraud under Section 12-120(3) because the 
claims arose “within the commercial context” of a business loan.  Id. at 1111.  More recently, 
this Court held that a party is entitled to a fee award where the plaintiff sought “recovery of 
damages sustained as a result of [a] commercial transaction,” regardless of the theory of 
recovery.  Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 559-600 (Idaho 2007). 
Syringa’s assertion that fees are only available under Section 12-120(3) where the cause of 
action arises directly out of a commercial transaction between the prevailing party and the party 
against which a fee award is sought is not correct.  This Court has held that an award of attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is appropriate where a “commercial transaction is integral to 
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the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.”  Blimka v. My 
Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594 (2007).  This “neither prohibits a fee 
award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct . . . nor does it require that 
there be a contract.”  Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728.  There merely must be a commercial transaction 
between the parties.  BECO v. J-U-B, 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008).     
Here, all parties understood that Qwest and Syringa would enter into a series of 
commercial transactions involving the IEN procurement.  ENA’s RFP response, to which 
Syringa contends it was a party, contemplated commercial transactions between Syringa and 
Qwest relating to the IEN procurement.  In its response, ENA identifies “Qwest Wholesale” 
several times as one of the “Strategic Suppliers” it expected to work with, along with Syringa, in 
implementing the IEN.  (R. pp. 163, 170, 369).  Qwest’s RFP response similarly “contemplated 
that Syringa would have a role in the project as a subcontractor to Qwest, and Qwest . . . 
repeatedly attempted to engage Syringa as a subcontractor on the project” after a Qwest was 
awarded a contract.  (R. p. 1565, Schmit Aff. ¶ 14).  The IEN procurement thus contemplated 
commercial transactions between Syringa and Qwest, although the direct prime contract 
relationship would be between Qwest and the State and/or ENA and the State. 
Moreover, the central allegations in Syringa’s Complaint assert joint conduct on the part 
of Qwest and the State with respect to the IEN procurement, which is indisputably a commercial 
transaction.  In the summary of its claims, Syringa alleged that “[t]he DOA and Qwest colluded 
to deprive Syringa – part of the vendor team which had the lowest responsible bid – from 
rightfully providing telecommunications services for the Idaho Education Network (the ‘IEN’).”  
(R. p. 18, Verified Complaint § 1).  Based on that central theory, Syringa alleged (i) that Qwest 
“conspired with [the State] to influence the award of the IEN implementation to Qwest to the 
detriment of Syringa,” (R. p. 27, id. ¶¶ 51-61), (ii) that Qwest “unduly influenced” and 
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“conspired with” the State, (R. p. 30, id. ¶¶ 70-72), (iii) that Qwest acted jointly with the State to 
cause a breach of Syringa’s Teaming Agreement with ENA, (R. pp. 33-34, id. ¶¶ 96-104), and 
(iv) that Qwest “conspired with [State personnel] to prevent Syringa from receiving work for the 
IEN technical network services. . . .”  (R. p. 35, id. ¶¶ 107-08).  These claims arise directly from 
the IEN procurement, which is a commercial transaction involving all of the parties here. 
The “commercial transaction” that comprises the gravamen of this dispute is the IEN 
procurement, a multi-party commercial transaction in which ENA, the State of Idaho, and Qwest 
were all involved, and that Syringa contended (incorrectly) it was improperly deprived of the 
ability to participate.  Moreover, the ENA and Qwest proposals each expressly contemplated 
that, regardless of which of them received a direct contract with the State, both Syringa and 
Qwest would participate in some capacity.  The trial court therefore correctly concluded that 
Qwest is entitled to a fee award under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
2. A Fee Award Is also Appropriate under Idaho Code Section 12-121. 
Qwest also sought a fee award pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121, which provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees 
to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall 
not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for 
the award of attorney's fees. The term “party” or “parties” is 
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Although the trial court did not address this portion of Qwest’s fee request, this Court has the 
discretion to affirm the trial court’s decision on alternative grounds.  See Hoffer v. City of Boise, 
257 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Idaho 2011) (affirming dismissal order on alternative grounds from those 
the trial court relied upon); Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 954 
(2004) (affirming dismissal order on alternative grounds); State v. Leavitt, 141 Idaho 895, 898 
(2005) (affirming denial of post-conviction relief on alternative grounds). 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT QWEST'S BRIEF - 39 
In Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public Util. Comm’n, 125 Idaho 401, 
408 (1994), this Court held that an award of attorney fees under Section 12-121 is appropriate 
when the Court, in its discretion, “is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, 
defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  “When deciding 
whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the 
entire course of the litigation must be taken into account.”  Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. 
Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 524-25 (2001).   
Syringa’s claims against Qwest were unfounded from the start.  Among other things, the 
Teaming Agreement did not constitute a binding contract under long-standing principles of Idaho 
law and specifically recognizes that a further agreement would be required.  (R. p5. 1555-56, 
§§ 2(a), 3(a)).  And Syringa’s management and board of directors knew that “the teaming 
agreement was only good until the award was made and a new agreement worked out” and was 
“subject to being rewritten upon the award.”  (R. pp. 2419, 2424).  Yet Syringa filed a complaint 
against Qwest alleging tortious interference with that non-binding agreement. 
In addition, at the time Syringa filed its complaint it had no evidence to support a claim 
that Qwest interfered with its ability to obtain work under the IEN project.  Syringa was advised 
in writing long before it filed suit that the DOA made the decision “unilaterally” based its 
determination as to what “would best serve the State of Idaho and the schools.”  (R. pp. 1651-54, 
at 1652).  Syringa’s designated Rule 30(6) representative admitted that Syringa had no evidence 
that Qwest influenced the State in making this decision.  (R. p. 1553, L. 1-7). 
The testimony of Syringa Board member Charles Creason best summarizes the theory 
under which Syringa sued Qwest: 
Q. . . . What did Qwest do that formed the basis of your 
decision to sue them? 
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THE WITNESS: I believe they interfered with our ability to obtain 
the IEN contract. 
Q.  . . . How? 
A. Well, I believe that they unduly influenced the contracting 
people. 
Q. How? 
A. Both by being very close to them, by making suggestions 
about how it's supposed to be done inappropriately, and by 
basically being way too cozy. 
(R. p. 2480, Creason Dep. p. 115, L. 3-16 (objection omitted)).  Mr. Creason went on to confess 
that the decision to sue Qwest was based on no evidence of misconduct at all:  
Q. . . . Previously in one of your responses when you said that 
the award was inappropriate because it was based not on merit but 
on patronage, you said you know it was done because it is easy to 
observe it. Do you recall that answer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you observe with respect to the IEN? 
A. Nothing with respect to the IEN. I mean, I don’t have any 
specifics as to the IEN. 
(R. p. 2484, Creason Dep. p. 119, L. 14-24).  Syringa had no evidence to support a claim for 
tortious interference against Qwest when it filed suit.  Syringa gambled on finding something in 
discovery to support its claims and lost its bet.  The attorney fee award to Qwest should be 
affirmed on the alternative ground of Section 12-121 of the Idaho Code. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective business advantage 
Syringa filed against Qwest, affirm the trial court’s award of attorneys fees to Qwest, and award 
Qwest its costs and fees incurred in this appeal. 
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